Post WORLD WAR II--Post COLD WAR Deja Vu
Written September 1994.  I have just finished reading "Shield of the Republic--the United States Navy in an era of cold war and violent peace", Volume I, 1945-1962.  In the early part of the book, the author, Michael T. Isenberg, stresses how unprepared our nation was, in the period 1945 to 1950, to define and implement its post World War II foreign policy, and therewith to determine the size and makeup of its armed services.
In that time period, I was just earning my spurs.  First, I was an Apprentice Seaman, completing my aeronautical degree at MIT. With a Reserve commission as an Ensign, I became a plank owner at what is now the Navy portion, of the Pacific Missile Range, on the ground floor of the new missile age.  As a consequence of the Berlin Blockade of 1948, the Navy expanded flight training opportunities, from the severe cutbacks after VJ day.  I was able to realize my high school, post Pearl Harbor, ambition to become a Naval Aviator.  Busy with those challenges, and in my youth, I probably was little aware of the political shortcomings (and the interrelated, interservice rivalries) transpiring in Washington.
Four careers later, I am all too aware (as are most Americans) of the political and constitutional shortfalls, that have and are occurring at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, and on Capitol Hill.  More significantly, for the messages of this essay, I can readily draw parallels of the dangers and costs to our nation (and, indeed, the world), of our inadequate federal government in the early post World War II, and the now post Cold War periods.   
Only when I read "Shield" and dwelt on my own remembrances, could I commiserate on the burdens of our nation and its leaders, in 1945 and the following four years.  Everything at the war's end was sudden, exceedingly earlier than assumed, unimaginable, or on a far greater scale than anticipated.
Three weeks before VE day, our revered, Depression-and-War President of 12 years, suddenly died, less than 3 months into his fourth term.  Catapulted into the Presidency was a new, virtually unknown, and "woefully unprepared" Vice President.  This VP, as customary, was chosen (not by the voters, but by the party nominee for President) for his political value, in the 1944 election, not for his qualifications as a possible replacement President (should the need arise).
"Truman was the outsider personified during FDR's last [three] months.  Not only did he not know where the bodies were buried (his ignorance of the Manhattan Project was only the most conspicuous example), he did not know the way to the cemetery." Suddenly Germany capitulated, much sooner than would have been imagined just 5 months earlier.  Decisions had to be made on how to immediately govern our defeated European enemies, and help our devastated Allies to begin their recoveries.  Simultaneously, the nation had to expeditiously move our service people and war resources, from Europe to the Pacific, to accelerate the war against Japan.
Most dramatic, the green President was made aware of, and forced to make the decision to employ, the most unimaginable, and most destructive weapon in the history of warfare.  Just over 3 months after VE day, after experiencing the horror of two atomic explosions, Japan bowed to the Allies, years ahead of expectations.  Suddenly peace was at hand.

But there was no calm, for the military and civilian leaders of our victorious nation.  Under the pressure of politicians, families, and the servicemen themselves, demobilization occurred in "chaotic", "tidal wave" fashion.  Maritime assets were stretched to the limit, to return millions of veterans from the European and Pacific theaters, for post-haste discharge, and absorption into peacetime employment or schooling.  
In addition the Navy was called upon to accomplish the humanitarian mission, of repatriation of 4 million Japanese, and 1 million Chinese and Koreans, from the far flung, wartime, Nipponese empire.  Ships, aircraft, and other armaments were scrapped, sold, given to other countries, or mothballed.  Active ships were dangerously undermanned.  "... for about two years following VJ day, any serious overseas crisis would have found the fleet unable to respond."  
With an unproven President, and with the failure to formulate a foreign policy consistent with the current and potential conditions of the world, during Truman's first (inherited) term; the nation could only react to the probes, of the yet not fully recognized enemy (world communism, led by the Soviet Union).  
A principal roadblock, to the determination of a foreign policy, and the corresponding makeup of the armed services, was inter- and intra-military services' rivalries.  Highlighting those rivalries was: (1) Army insistence on unification; (2) Army coveting the Marine Corps; (3) the (Army) Air Force demand for formal recognition, of its de facto independence; (4) the Air Force wish to absorb, or limit the missions of Naval Aviation; and (5) the Navy's determination to maintain its integrated capability, to meet the global responsibilities of a leading maritime nation.
America's first Secretary of Defense had had military experience in World War I, as well as a high degree of management success between wars on Wall Street. He had served under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman in the Navy Department, being elevated to Navy Secretary prior to his Defense appointment.  Under his direction, initial unification of the military services was accomplished, under the 1947 law.  Until his suicide, he had held the interservice rivalries in check, despite the competition for limited military appropriations.

"... among [Truman's] weaknesses was a penchant for rewarding friends and wheelhorses for the Democratic party; the President was a down-the-line party man, and he liked loyalties."  In his 1948 reelection campaign, when many had written him off as a "lost cause", Truman "could find noone [but Louis Johnson] to handle his campaign finances".  Johnson came through in spades, including "probably $250,000 of his own money".  He was at the "top of the President's IOU list". He was rewarded by being appointed as the 2nd Secretary of Defense ("seeing himself ... as the obvious successor to Harry Truman in 1952").
"FDR had repaid some political debts", after his 1936 reelection, "by appointing [Johnson] Assistant Secretary of War".  Johnson proved to be "a relentless conniver and self-server", such that FDR "was forced to remove him" in 1940.  "He spent the war years" in "meaningless odd jobs".  Yet as a political payoff, here he was in 1949 being appointed, to perhaps the most crucial national position at the time, and he nearly did the nation in.   
"Within days of taking office, and without so much as a word to either [the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations], he canceled construction of" what was to have been the first supercarrier.  He taunted the Navy by proclaiming that it had "built its last big carrier", threatening to "leave [it] with one carrier only" for joy-riding by the old Admirals.  He announced "that Marine aviation would be transferred to the Air Force".  The Secretary of the Army said "that the entire Marine Corps should become part of the Army".  Johnson followed up by issuing a "gag order" on his military subordinates.

Checks and balances to the rescue (for a time).  "In his maiden speech on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1916, Carl Vinson had not equivocated, 'My country and its safety come before any party'."  Now Chairman of the new Armed Services Committee, he called the new Defense Secretary on the Congressional carpet.  He "laid down the law", declaring "that such pronouncements, by Johnson or any of his subordinates, had damn well be cleared with Congress first".
The Navy Secretary resigned.  Johnson handpicked the successor. The successor had no qualifications, except that "in 1948 he had helped deliver Nebraska for the President".  His loyalty was with Johnson, not the Navy.  "At a time when the Navy needed all the bureaucratic leverage possible, the service found itself on the hit list of the Secretary of Defense and without any protection whatsoever from its top civilian."
The Navy opposed the huge appropriations, for a vulnerable strategic bomber for the USAF, to come at the disastrous expense of the Navy.  Zealots, in the strategic portion of the USAF, were selling the ability to win wars "on the cheap", by putting most all our eggs in the saturation and atomic bombing basket.  

The Navy sounded "General Quarters".  A number of senior officers sacrificed their careers, by taking the battle to the public, in a campaign dubbed by the press as "the Admiral's Revolt".  Vinson held hearings. Johnson proposed drastic Navy cuts.  "... when the smoke of battle had cleared, the real issue remained unresolved: how to determine appropriate roles for the Executive, Congress, and the services in the conduct of national strategy and national defense."
In less than 8 months, the "enemy" would answer our questions for us.  Sensing our lack of a fully defined foreign policy, our lack of resolve, and our lack of preparedness, communist North Korea in June 1950 invaded South Korea.  
Inter- and intra-service rivalries (mostly healthy, but sometimes not) would continue. But the Navy demonstrated, in the Korean "police action", as it had in World War II, the necessity of its integrated capability, to meet the global responsibilities of our maritime nation.  With hindsight, one can only imagine what would have happened to our nation (and the free world), in our two "hot" wars and the countless confrontations since 1949, had the politics of our leaders permitted our foreign policy, to be based on preparedness for war "on the cheap".    
In the terms of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, the nation has been faced with challenges, that came with the end of the Cold War.  The end was not so sudden as that of World War II; but, it certainly came unexpectedly soon by all (except, perhaps, the Intelligence communities).  After forty years, the nature of its end, and the consequences thereof, were unimagined.
In a number of ways, the post Cold War conditions have been crucially different, than those after World War II.  We didn't defeat our adversary.  The ferric oxide of the Iron Curtain caused collapse from within.  The leading communist country cried uncle, and the "Evil Empire" fell apart.

Whereas the USA had been "the only economic victor of" World War II, America and the Soviet Union in the 1980s were neck and neck, as to which economy would collapse first.  Unconscionable deficit spending over the decades, and especially during the spendthrift terms of President Reagan (continued under Bush and Clinton), resulted in the hobbling of federal government initiatives, to meet the post Cold War foreign and domestic demands and opportunities.  In the late 1940s, our nation provided Marshall Plan funds to reconstruct western Europe.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the USA is dependent on foreign investments to keep the federal government out of bankruptcy.
At the close of World War II, the all-at-once and untried President was unencumbered by the political patronage system, during much of his first term.  The nation's best talents had gravitated to government service, just prior to and during America's total commitment to war.  Those in the top appointive positions had been tempered during the war years, and their actions were governed by Congressman Vinson's 1916 pronouncement. By 1948 patronage was in vogue again, and has been ever since.  
The costs and dangers to our nation of patronage, special interest groups, Political Action Committees access and influence buying, never-stop campaigning, and the other banes of our present political system, are well presented in two books that I have recently read: (1) H. R. Haldeman's "The Haldeman Diaries--inside the Nixon White House"; and, (2) Bob Woodward's "The Agenda--inside the Clinton White House".
Faced with world leadership after World War II, we were not prepared with a foreign policy, to cope with global conditions. We did not anticipate that the British, French, and Dutch would be incapable, of renewed governing of their far-flung possessions.
We were inconsistent, in our responses to the instabilities, that resulted from nationalist (sometimes communistic) uprisings, that occurred in the resultant vacuums.  Our reactive treatment, of one rebellion (French Indo-China), would lead to the 1960s Vietnam War, the cultural and economic consequences of which era, we are still saddled.
Faced with being the surviving (but economically drained) Superpower, at the end of the Cold War, our nation under 3 Presidents has had no blueprint (not even an outline), as to how to provide world leadership in the face of the new world conditions.  Since the collapse of the Soviet colossus, the world is experiencing horrible loss of life and unrest due to ethnic, religious, tribal, and nationalistic warfare.  
In addition, with the duel of the Superpowers at an end, the cries for humanitarian actions, in countries throughout the world, have come to the fore on our TV screens, and in the ink of our presses.  As in its infancy after World War II, the United Nations has shown that it has limited authority, and inadequate capability, to cope with global crises.  What actions the United States has taken have been too little, too late, or nonexistent.  What is needed is world leadership, that will implement measures that preclude or alleviate the conditions, before the fact.      
In other writings, I have developed and recommended solutions, to how our nation could best provide world leadership, within the constraints of our depleted, and IOU filled, treasury.  The USA has long since discarded the eighteenth century advice, to avoid entangling alliances.  Notably, we successfully employed NATO, SEATO, and other pacts, to avoid "hot" wars during the Cold War.  
We can guard against war (and other breaches of the peace), and seek global well-being, by leading all nations to establish regional Peace and Welfare Treaty Organizations (PWTOs) throughout the world.  The pacts would be renewable and amendable as conditions change.  

The USA could control the degree of its "entanglements", by negotiating participations based on our national interests, and what we can afford.  The latitudes and limitations of the Executive branch would be clearly established and communicated, through the advice and consent (treaty) power of the Senate.  At long last the war powers controversy between the two branches, left unresolved by the Supreme Court, would be settled.  In contrast to the post World War II period, we would have a firm basis, on which to decide the makeup of our armed services.
Alas, we are again stymied, by the evils that come with our political parties; i.e., in this instance, patronage.  In an editorial of August 24, 1994, headed "GOVERNMENT FOR SALE--Ambassadorial contributions", it was reported: "Despite a promise to depoliticize America's diplomatic corps, President Clinton, more than 19 months in office now, continues to hand out ambassadorial postings to generous campaign contributors at a rate exceeding the historical White House norm.  As of last month, 42 percent of Clinton's ambassadorial appointees were political supporters."
If we are to retain a leadership role, particularly with the proposed implementation of PWTOs, our diplomats and intelligence gatherers must know and report intimately, what is happening or threatening, in all regions and all countries.
Quoted in "Shield" was the following from Ruth Benedict, Office of War Information: "With every occupied country the United States assists in freeing from Axis domination, with every Asiatic country where we operate in cooperation with the existing culture, the need for intelligent understanding of that country and its ways of life will be crucial ... The danger--and it would be fatal to world peace--is that in our ignorance of their cultural values we shall meet in head-on collision and incontinently fall back on the old pattern of imposing our own values by force."  
Have we applied that advice, in our late 1980s and 1990s foreign policy challenges?  Latin America, Iraq, Bosnia, Samolia, Rwanda, Haiti?
America is in a dangerous state, akin to what it was in 1787 with an ineffective Articles of Confederation government.  Our founding fathers corrected the situation then, by instituting our Constitution.  Our two party system is full of faults, and is ineffective.  The situation is not new (as seen above), but the nation's condition is now critical.
Voters,in frustration, are insisting on term limitations, to chasten the politicians.  Congress, again and again and again, is diddling (at best half-heartedly) with campaign contribution limitations.  They are swatting at gnats.  In the 1992 Presidential election, a White Knight came forward wielding a $100 million sword, swatting at gnats also.  What is needed is to get rid of, or at least corral, elephants and donkeys!
In my other writings, I have also developed recommendations, to better assure the quality of our elected and appointed officials; to rid our government of patronage, "pork", special interest domination, gridlock, et al.  In brief, without the elaboration, they are:

1. Treat elections as a hiring process.  Hiring criteria would be established in each state, representing the consolidated constituents' expressed interests.  Any eligible person could apply or be nominated, whether or not affiliated with a party.

In place of primaries, each state legislature would screen and establish the running slates.  Each states' slate for President would be forwarded to the U.S. Senate, for counting and paring to a national slate of the top six.  Low cost, only public funded, campaigns would be restricted to 9 or 10 weeks for President and members of Congress.  Debates would serve as the primary means of decision making by the electorate.

2. There would be no electorial college.  The candidate with the top vote count, verified by the Senate, would be President.  The newly elected President would be privileged, and required, to choose the Vice President from the other 5 highly qualified candidates.  The primary duty of the Vice President would be the President's Chief of Staff, "a heart beat away", qualified, AND in the know.

3. Appointed officials would be recruited by the President for the duration of his term plus 6 months (a la World War II).  In its confirmation responsibility, the Senate would be obliged to insure that patronage played no part in the President's selection.  Indeed, the Senate could weigh the high performance of an incumbent, with the case presented that the replacement appointee would perform even better, or was essential to the Administration's organization.

4. Depoliticize the Supreme Court and Inferior federal courts. Preclude patronage appointments, and help assure that judgment (not activism) will be the product of the courts.  Do these by shifting the nomination function, from the Executive to the Judicial branch.  To assure that the members of the Senate test for merit, and not play politics, require that the confirmation hearings be chaired by a Supreme Court Justice.

5. Require the Congress to revise its committee and officer structure to preclude abuse of power, and to assure "one member/one effective vote" in all enactments.

6. Have the federal government adopt 13 inviolable principles, to govern the generation of federal revenues, and the expenditure of federal appropriations, so as to control federal omnipotence and maintain justice for all.     
     We the People must heed the advice of President Washington, in his Farewell Address in 1796: "If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates ...".  It's time.  Lets get on with it!
          Guy G. Wooten, CDR USN (Ret)


Responsibility #89
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